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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-VENUE-EFFECT OF CONTRAC'l' PROVISION FIXING
VENUE AS To FUTURE LITIGATION-Defendants, residents of Harris County,
Texas, executed in Harris County a conditional sale contract to purchase a
food freezer from plaintiff's assignor. One of the contract provisions was
that any suit on the contract was to be tried in Travis County, Texas.1 Plaintiff subsequently brought an action on the contract in Travis County, and
defendants, contrary to their agreement, requested the trial court to
transfer the action to a court of proper jurisdiction in Harris County, which
was the proper county for suit under the applicable venue statute.2 In
response, plaintiff argued that, since the contract created an obligation
performable in Travis County, the contract came within a statutory exception to the general venue rule and Travis County was the proper
county in which to bring the suit.8 The trial court denied defendants'
motion and upheld the contract provision. On appeal, held, reversed.-'
The contract provision specifying that any action brought on the contract
is to be brought in Travis County is contrary to public policy and consequently void.11 Tilley v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 367 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963).
The holding of the court in the principal case adheres to the general
rule followed by the majority of American courts regarding contracts which
attempt to fix venue before the cause of action has accrued. 6 However, the
1 The provision in relevant part stated: "Any suit brought on the Contract of Sale
shall be brought in Travis County, Texas." Principal case at 361. Apparently the seller,
who was located in Houston, Harris County, Texas, regularly assigned its conditional
sale contracts to plaintiff, the Capital National Bank, in Austin, Travis County, Texas.
Ibid.
2 "No person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the county in
which he has his domicile except •.. if a person has contracted in writing to perform an
obligation in a particular county, expressly naming such county, or a definite place
therein, by such writing, suit upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against
him, either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile." TEX. REv. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5) (1950).
3 Ibid. However, the court held that the obligation involved was the obligation to pay,
which was not, under the contract, performable in Travis County. Principal case at 362;
cf. Mccurdy v. King, 359 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Atkins v. Wheeler, 307 S.W.2d
294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hunsaker, 50 S.W.2d 367
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
4 The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to transfer the
action to a court of proper jurisdiction in Harris County. Principal case at 362.
5 Furthermore, the court held that the contract provision did not come within the
statutory exception. Id. at 362.
6 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Codiga, 62 Cal. App. 117, 216 Pac. 383
(1923); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856); Gardner & North
Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Deaton, 1 Misc. 2d 90, 146 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 286
App. Div. 992, 144 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 182 N.C.
498, 109 S.E. 362 (1921); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1955). The present discussion does not
include contracts attempting to fix venue after the cause of action has accrued. For a case
illustrating the distinction, see Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn.), appeal dis•
missed, 135 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1942).
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reasons for the rule are rooted in a past which seems to evidence ignorance
of the historical nature and purpose of venue. The rule developed partially
as a result of certain courts' confusion between venue and jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to try an action; 7 jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is expressly conferred by constitution, statute, or
treaty, and it may not be conferred by the consent of the parties.s On the
other hand, venue refers to the locality in which a law suit is tried, and
the venue statutes, being based on considerations of general convenience
and expediency,9 are intended for the benefit of the parties as well as for
that of the courts. 10 However, since contract provisions attempting to
limit jurisdiction are void,U the courts held that contract provisions
attempting to fix venue in a particular county, to the exclusion of courts in
another county where venue would be properly laid, were likewise void as
attempts to oust courts of their jurisdiction.12 However, the courts of the
latter county would no more be ousted of their jurisdiction by a contractual
venue provision than they would be if the action were brought in an
improper county and the defendant, by engaging in litigation, waived his
right to object to improper venue. 13
Presumably, although the court did not discuss this fact, the defendants
in the principal case were actually aware of the venue-fixing provision at
the time the contract was concluded.14 If this was true, then the principal
case would seem to be distinguishable from the cases on which the general
rule is based, for only one of those cases involved an agreement in which
7 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Paige v. Sinclair,
237 Mass. 482, 130 N.E. 177 (1921).
8 Industrial Addition Ass'n v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 310, 313 (1944); Neirbo Co.
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra note 7, at 167; Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Bodell,
132 Mont. 243, 316 P .2d 788 (1957). For a compilation of state jurisdictional statutes, see
Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307, 317 nn.40 &: 41
(1951).
9 Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856).
10 Venue relates to the convenience of litigants and consequently is a personal privilege
which may be waived. Brown v. Alabama Chem. Co., 207 Ala. 215, 92 So. 260 (1922);
Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Bodell, 132 Mont. 243, 316 P .2d 788 (1957); Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) (dictum). But see Nute v. Hamilton
Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 9 (emphasis on convenience of the courts).
11 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874); Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 Fed. 508 (6th Cir. 1897); Nashua River
Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, lll N.E. 678 (1916); Kent v. Universal
Film Mfg. Corp., 200 App. Div. 539, 193 N.Y. Supp. 838 (1922).
12 Ziegelmeyer v. Pelphery, 133 Tex. 73, 125 S.W.2d 1083 (1939); International
Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (1919); Eaton v. International
Travelers' Ass'n, 136 S.W. 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). However, it is not clear what
the courts mean by the term "void." Generally it is taken to mean that the provision
may not be specifically enforced; however, the voidness does not necessarily preclude an
action for damages for breach of the contractual agreement. Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins.
Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856) (dictum).
1s Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Speer, 225 Ark. 948, 286 S.W.2d 485 (1956); Lieffring
v. Birt, 154 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1941); Dossey v. Oehler, 359 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962).
H Principal case at 360; see note 19 infra.
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there was actual consent to the venue provision. 15 Furthermore, one-half of
those cases involved contracts which actually sought to oust certain courts of
their jurisdiction, and all the cases were based on venue provisions in insurance contracts.16 While the courts, in applying the general rule, seem to
make no distinction with reference to the nature of the contract,17 it would
seem that provisions in insurance contracts should be subjected to policy considerations different from those which govern conditional sale contracts.
Such factors as the relative bargaining strength of the parties, the length
of time the venue provision would be effective, and the actual convenience
to both parties might weigh heavily against allowing such a provision in
an insurance contract, while the same reasoning might not apply to a
conditional sale contract. For example, the factor of convenience should be
given special consideration since, presumably, an insurance company will
be interested in discouraging litigation against itself, while the seller in a
conditional sale contract will usually be the party instigating the litigation.
Consequently, if the venue statutes are primarily based on convenience18-an
element that can be waived-there should be no reason to prevent a party
from waiving that convenience at the time the contract is concluded,
provided the party waiving his venue privilege actually consents.19
A smaller number of courts which follow the general rule do so on the
ground that contract provisions fixing venue before the cause of action has
15 International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (1919)
(contract based on actual consent), the leading authority in Texas, based its holding on
the following cases: Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874) (agreement
induced by invalid state statute); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen
Mills, 82 Fed. 508 (6th Cir. 1897) (actual consent, but contract ousted certain courts of
jurisdiction); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856) (due to
peculiarities in policy, defendant did not know of provision); Eaton v. International
Travelers' Ass'n, 136 S.W. -817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (contract subject to insurance company by-laws which were changed after the contract was entered into).
16 Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, supra note 15 (insurance contract-excluded federal courts);
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, supra note 15 (insurance
contract-jurisdiction limited to federal courts); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., supra
note 15 (insurance contract-jurisdiction limited to specified county); Eaton v. International Travelers' Ass'n, supra note 15 (insurance contract-jurisdiction limited to
specified county). In International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, supra note 15, the agreement ousted no court of its jurisdiction, since it limited jurisdiction only to the courts
of a certain county (see text accompanying note 13 supra) and the general trial courts of
the state are exactly the same, regardless of where they are located throughout the state.
Benson v. Eastern Bldg.&: Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 66 N.E. 627 (1903).
17 See Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269 N.W. 367 (1936).
18 See note IO supra.
19 In Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939), the Court held
that an agreement with a state designating an agent for service of process within the state
constituted consent to be sued in the federal courts in that state and thereby waived
objection to the venue. However, in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953),
the Court clarified its holding in Neirbo and held that driving on the highways of a
state having a nonresident -motorist statute, while sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
state courts (because jurisdiction in such cases does not rest on consent), did not vest
jurisdiction in the federal courts in the same state, since "the defendant did not in fact
consent" to be sued in the federal courts so as to waive his federal venue rights.
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accrued are violative of applicable venue statutes.20 These courts conclude
that to allow parties to substitute their will for the will of the legislature
would tend to negative the statutory venue plan.21 For example, the party
inserting the venue provision might try to choose counties which, for one
reason or another, would be most favorable to any litigation he might
bring on the contract.22 Moreover, even though a defendant may waive his
objection to venue at trial, the courts will not let him "bind himself in
advance by an agreement which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit
his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be
presented."23 Presumably, the courts are trying to protect a party who is
unaware of the venue-fixing provision, or who is in an unequal bargaining
position vis-a-vis the party imposing the provision, from being deprived of
his rights. 24 On the other hand, it would appear desirable to allow parties
a certain amount of latitude and discretion in forming their contracts.25
In balancing these competing interests, it seems reasonable to allow the
parties this flexibility in contract formation, yet at the same time to
subject them to the discretion of the court to transfer or dismiss the action
on motion if the court concludes that the contractual waiver of venue was
not a valid consensual agreement arrived at between parties bargaining
as equals.26 However, the court in the principal case did not discuss these
considerations, contenting itself instead with reliance on "precedent"
which perhaps clouds the real issues involved.
While a minority of courts have reached the opposite result and have
enforced contracts fixing venue before the cause of action has accrued,
these courts have done so only with the aid of statutes which provide that
the parties may seek a change of venue by written stipulation or by
mutual consent in open court after the cause of action has accrued.27 These
20 Gardner &: North Roofing &: Siding Corp. v. Deaton, 1 Misc. 2d 90, 146 N.Y.S.2d
577 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 286 App. Div. 992, 114 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor
Car Co., 182 N.C. 498, 109 S.E. 362 (1921).
21 Cases cited note 20 supra.
22 "Such contracts might be induced by considerations tending to bring the administration of justice into disrepute; such as the greater or less intelligence and impartiality
of judges, the greater or less integrity and capacity of juries, the influence, more or less,
arising from the personal, social or political standing of parties in one or another county."
Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 184 (1856).
23 Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874). The Texas court quoted this
in International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630, 632 (1919).
24 Ibid.
211 "[C]ourts are less and less disposed to interfere with parties making such [venuefixing] contracts as ~ey choose, so long as they interfere with no one's welfare but their
own." Daley v. People's Bldg., Loan &: Sav. Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N.E. 452 (1901); see 6
UTAH L. REv. 128 (1958). But see 19 MONT. L. REv. 165 (1958).
26 See State ex rel. Kuhn v. Luchsinger, 231 Wis. 533, 286 N.W. 72 (1939); cf. Gardner
&: North Roofing &: Siding Corp. v. Deaton, 1 Misc. 2d 90, 146 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct.),.
a!fd, 286 App. Div. 992, 144 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955).
27 Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Bodell, 132 Mont. 243, 316 P .2d 788 (1957); State ex rer.
Schwabacher Bros. &: Co. v. Superior Court, 61 Wash. 681, 112 Pac. 927 (1911); State ex. rel.
Kuhn v. Luchsinger, supra note 26. See also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-405 (1956);:
KY. REv. STAT. § 452.010 (1962); s.c. CODE ANN. § 10-305 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-13-9(4) (1953).
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statutes do not in themselves authorize formation of contracts with provisions fixing venue before the cause of action has accrued, but the courts
have declared that such statutes evidence an intention on the part of the
legislature to sanction stipulations as to venue.28 These courts conclude that,
if the parties may agree after the action is begun that the place of trial
shall be in any county in the state, it seems only logical to allow them to do
so before the action is begun.2 9
It would seem that the foregoing result is the more sound, and that it
should be reached whether or not the particular state has a statute which
permits the parties to agree on a different venue after commencement of
the action. It recognizes that venue is intended largely for the benefit of
the defendant, and also that the parties themselves can determine where it
will be most convenient to bring an action on the contract. If the contract
provisions are, at the same time, subject to the discretion of the court to
transfer the action (in effect denying specific performance of the contract
provision),8 0 then the convenience of the parties and the courts will be
best served.
Robert C. Bonges

28
29

Cases cited note 27 supra.

Ibid.
so See generally 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §§ 1162-71 (1951).

